SKILLEMALL.ai

AC llm-verify

Verify an LLM API endpoint — model authenticity, billing inflation, relay provenance, performance and silent downgrades. Use when the user asks whether the model they are paying for is genuine, whether a relay or proxy is trustworthy, whether they are being overcharged, or whether a model has been quietly downgraded. 检测 LLM API 端点的真伪、计费掺水、中转来源、性能与降智;当用户问"我用的模型是不是真的"、"这个中转站靠谱吗"、"是不是被降智了"、"计费对不对"时使用。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: asale ai v0.2.1 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 867 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

Verify an LLM API endpoint — model authenticity, billing inflation, relay provenance, performance and silent downgrades.

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
93/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
90
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host README.md:12
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/asale-ai/llm-verify/main/install.sh | sh

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 17 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 867 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 3 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 401: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 7 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 17 items
    • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 90.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill’s core purpose is coherent, but its install instructions rely on remote code execution and a default installer that can modify every detected AI coding tool.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · 13 Aug 2026