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DC usd1transaction

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: AsgherAli v1.0.0 5 files body ≈ 241 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 64/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, failures and branches, running it twice

ReferenceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
51/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
64/100
Has gaps
When it triggers w 12
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 7
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:25
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Risk: The skill requires a raw wallet private key and can broadcast token transfers.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:16
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    - privateKey: string (secure, required) - sender wallet private key
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:53
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…nFR+MDik6udKfj2+9ZsmTLV0/t73v…I7L+1+yjEbQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:196
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…ovq+VyC9…p8L/81Rk…DIw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:212
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…3SV+TCHq…BR5+ti7Hw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:286
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-Gih++NYHEiP+oyD4…FSg+33Hp…p5Z+W3A==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:319
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…ov7+qofC…XjQ==",
    detector

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 64/100

  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 14 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 241 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 7 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (0 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill openly performs Wormhole testnet token transfers, but it asks the agent to handle a raw wallet private key and can broadcast transfers without a clear confirmation or strong validation step.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026