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CD Gbrow

Full-featured headless browser for OpenClaw agents. Navigate, snapshot with accessibility tree (@ref clicks), tabs, JS execution, cookie import. No vision model needed — free, fast, reliable.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: ashish797 v1.0.0 MIT-0 27 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 259 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 36/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: steps, result and completion, when it triggers

ProcedurePlaywrightAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
74/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
84
Quality 40%
58
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
36/100
Unfinished process
Steps w 15
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host setup.sh:25
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host SKILL.md:33
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
    curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ashish797/Gbrow/main/setup.sh | bash
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store src/commands.ts:98
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    'cookie-import-browser': { category: 'Interaction', description: 'Import cookies from installed Chromium browsers (opens picker, or use --domain for direct import)', usage: 'cookie-import-browser [bro
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host setup.sh:3
    Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code) (code comment)
    # Usage: curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ashish797/Gbrow/main/setup.sh | bash
    comment

Files scanned: 27. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "tools"

Process rating: all ten parameters 36/100

  • 0Steps. Prose only: no discrete steps
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1259 tokens
  • low The response is described with custom markup (15 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3No numbered steps or checklist
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 191: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 19 headings
  • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 58.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
Gbrow is a real browser automation skill, but it bundles under-disclosed access to browser sessions, local files, repository state, and an external agent runner.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026