SKILLEMALL.ai

AB aiscan-ai-readiness-scanner

AIScan v3.1 audits websites for AI-agent readiness through its stable REST API, MCP server, CLI/CI tooling, evidence-backed scoring, and fix-ready remediation.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Asif v2.0.0 MIT-0 9 files body ≈ 2 411 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

AIScan v3.1 audits websites for AI-agent readiness through its stable REST API, MCP server, CLI/CI tooling, evidence-backed scoring, and fix-ready remediation.

As a process B 78/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, progress reporting

IntegrationTelegramAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
78/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Result and completion w 14
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1

    ✓ Guard found no suspicious behaviour. 1 matches are attack strings quoted in this security skill's own documentation.

    Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "openclaw"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 78/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 95 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2411 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 159: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 14 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 95 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (7 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill is mostly coherent, but bundled instructions include under-scoped code modification guidance and a risky remote script execution fallback that users should review before installing.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · 25 Aug 2026