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AC avenger-initiative

Encrypted GitHub backup and restore for any OpenClaw agent system. Creates branch-per-night backups with smart retention (7 daily, 8 weekly, 12 monthly branches). Backs up openclaw.json (AES-256 encrypted), agent memories, SOUL/IDENTITY files, cron jobs, and custom skills to a private GitHub vault. Triggers on phrases like "avenger backup", "backup system", "push to vault", "sync vault", "avenger restore", "restore from vault", "setup avenger", "avenger status", "avenger init", "configure backup", "set up backup". Also auto-runs after any critical config change.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Asif v1.0.5 MIT-0 11 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 906 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 64/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

GeneratorGitHubAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
64/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security clawhubsafe.txt:51
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    ✗ No privilege escalation
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SECURITY.md:65
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    | Shell scripts with `chmod +x` | Heuristic: privilege escalation | Makes backup.sh executable (standard install) |

Files scanned: 11. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "openclaw"

Process rating: all ten parameters 64/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 17 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 906 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 11 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 568: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 14 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 17 items
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 2)
  • +3All 3 scripts are documented
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a real backup tool, but it needs review because it can automatically upload broad OpenClaw agent state to GitHub while leaving most of that data plaintext.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026