DC clawtrial
(no description)
Not recommendedlow grade D
As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Instruction override medium severity
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
If you install
The text contains phrases like "ignore previous instructions" or "you are now…". That is an attempt to hijack the agent: it may break your rules, the system limits or company policy.
For the author
An honest skill does not need them: state the role and the rules directly without overriding other instructions. Otherwise catalog scanners and corporate filters will block the listing.
How to improve
- Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 10
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 10
-
medium Instruction override
en-ignore-previousscripts/setup-cron.js:26Instruction-override phrase ("ignore previous instructions") (quoted — discussed, not commanded)- **Jailbreak Attempts**: User trying to bypass safety guidelines
quoted -
medium Instruction override
en-ignore-previousscripts/trigger-evaluation.js:43Instruction-override phrase ("ignore previous instructions") (quoted — discussed, not commanded)4. **Jailbreak Attempts**: User trying to bypass safety guidelines
quoted -
medium Instruction override
en-ignore-previoussrc/evaluator.js:199Instruction-override phrase ("ignore previous instructions") (quoted — discussed, not commanded)- **Jailbreak Attempts**: User trying to bypass safety guidelines
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:289High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"integrity": "sha5…ywo+qwL+oL8H…C1U+vRfLQDvw==",
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:305High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha512-Yqfm+XDx0+Prh3…1yC+JWZ2…IL7+vK+Clp7…D7g==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:318High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…xZl+RoGR…fbT/ZgrF…0EA==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:331High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…3bJ+V0If…IXN+CL65…a4w==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:347High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)"integrity": "sha5…H47+FFon…OsV/4+RRsz…0ig==",
quoted -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-cron-mentionscripts/clawtrial.js:619Mentions editing / listing crontab (quoted — discussed, not commanded)const currentCrontab = execSync('crontab -l 2>/dev/null || echo ""', { encoding: 'utf8' });quoted -
low Dangerous commands
cmd-cron-mentionscripts/setup-cron.js:108Mentions editing / listing crontab (string literal in code, not executed)console.log('Add this to your crontab (crontab -e):\n');code literal
Files scanned: 45. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
frontmatterSKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found - error
name-missingSKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name` - error
description-missingSKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 19 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 811 tokens
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -37 of 7 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 14 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 19 items
- +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.
External checks
ClawHub: suspicious
The package superficially matches an 'agent monitoring' purpose but contains multiple instructions and install-time behaviors that modify agent system prompts, add automatic silent execution hooks, and enable external case submission — these behaviors are disproportionate and risky without careful review.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 20 Feb 2026