FC cc-changelog-monitor
Monitor Claude Code releases and get Telegram alerts when new versions ship. Zero AI credits — pure bash monitoring.
As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
How to improve
- Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
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critical Secrets in code
secret-telegram-botscripts/monitor.sh:10Telegram bot token (quoted — discussed, not commanded)TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN="${TELE…AE9…}"quoted
Medium and low: 3
-
low Dangerous commands
cmd-cron-mentioncron-payload.md:38Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation of a security skill)crontab -e
security skill -
low Exfiltration
exfil-webhook-urlscripts/monitor.sh:82Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \placeholder -
low Exfiltration
net-credential-usescripts/monitor.sh:82Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot${TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN}/sendMessage" \vendor-host
Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 12 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 541 tokens
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 116: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 10 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
- +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
- +3All 2 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.