SKILLEMALL.ai

BD mass-sandbox

Execute untrusted code or commands in a secure, isolated Docker environment. Use when asked to run unknown scripts, third-party skills, or any code that might pose a security risk to the host system.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Anthony Assi v1.0.0 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 419 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 6 d ago

Execute untrusted code or commands in a secure, isolated Docker environment.

As a process D 45/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureDockerSoftware developmentAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
94/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
100
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
45/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 0

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 45/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (mass-sandbox) differs from the folder (agent-securitysandbox)
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
    • 100Steps. 10 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 419 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 199: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 9 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 10 items
    • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill is meant to sandbox risky code, but its reviewed package is missing the actual sandbox runner and makes security claims that cannot be verified from the artifact.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 16 Sept 2026