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BC resumex

Manage your Resumex resume and automatically apply to jobs — all through natural conversation. Fetches your live resume from Resumex, uses built-in web search to find best-matched jobs, presents a ranked list for your approval, auto-fills job application forms via a local Playwright helper script, and logs every application to the Resumex Job Tracker. Also handles full resume editing: experience, education, skills, projects, achievements, profile fields, AI tailoring, and Telegram delivery.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Atharva Badgujar v2.0.1 MIT-0 8 files body ≈ 5 044 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorTelegramPlaywrightInfrastructureWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
80/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
58
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege job_applier.py:527
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    "--disable-setuid-sandbox",
    code literal
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url PRIVACY.md:51
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    | `POST https://api.telegram.org/bot.../sendMessage` | Only when you say "send my resume on Telegram" | `TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN` (in URL) + formatted resume text | Deliver to your Telegram |
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SECURITY.md:44
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    - If Telegram credentials are provided: makes one call to `https://api.telegram.org/bot.../sendMessage`
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url SECURITY.md:123
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    - It is passed directly to `https://api.telegram.org/bot<TOKEN>/sendMessage`
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url send_pdf.py:29
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    TELEGRAM_BASE = "https://api.telegram.org/bot"
    vendor-hostquoted

Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5044 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "repository"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "env"

Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5044 tokens
  • 100Steps. 67 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 16 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -228 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 495: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 35 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 67 items
  • +4Has examples (21 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 58.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill mostly does what it claims, but it needs review because it can submit real job applications with personal data and contains a misleading browser-automation disclosure.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026