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BD controld

Manage Control D DNS filtering service via API. Use for DNS profile management, device configuration, custom blocking rules, service filtering, analytics settings, and network diagnostics. Triggers when user mentions Control D, DNS filtering, DNS blocking, device DNS setup, or managing DNS profiles.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Austin Garrod v1.0.3 4 files · 1 script body ≈ 4 997 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

IntegrationInfrastructureData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
75/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
65
Quality 40%
89
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
48/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 7

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 7
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/controld.sh:430
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $CONTROLD_API_TOKEN" "$url"
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/controld.sh:432
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $CONTROLD_API_TOKEN" "$url" -o "$output"
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:38
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $CONTROLD_API_TOKEN" \
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:42
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $CONTROLD_API_TOKEN" \
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:48
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $CONTROLD_API_TOKEN" \
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:54
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -X PUT -H "Authorization: Bearer $CONTROLD_API_TOKEN" \
    • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:60
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
      curl -s -X DELETE -H "Authorization: Bearer $CONTROLD_API_TOKEN" \

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 15 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4997 tokens
    • 100Steps. 69 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 300: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 31 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 69 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (21 code blocks)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This is a real Control D management skill, but it gives broad account, billing, organization, DNS, and endpoint-deployment authority without enough guardrails.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026