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DC feishu-post

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: autogame-17 v1.1.7 10 files body ≈ 297 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

Proceduretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
57/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:19
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…bR6+k7Fi…rEB/8rLw…bbj/Mp8TWH/v1O+p487m6xskxw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:34
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-j+gKEx…ahh+s1F2HZ+wAce…RkU++ZWQr…uoQ==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:80
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…rvP+yUUf…4tH/iSSo…tEA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:98
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…vPe+zGay…l5w==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:107
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…9dM/mwVgvbZJaSNaRk+bshk…Kbz+IoId…W0Q==",
    detector

Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 10 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 297 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 6 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 10 items
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill mainly sends Feishu rich-text posts as advertised, but it also includes an undocumented debug script that can read and print Feishu message data using available credentials.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026