SKILLEMALL.ai

BD openclaw-aligenie-push

主动向天猫精灵推送消息的技能。触发时机:(1) 用户要求"推送到天猫精灵"、"播报到天猫精灵"时 (2) 需要通过天猫精灵语音播报通知用户时 (3) 将任务完成状态或提醒推送到天猫精灵设备时。触发时机:(1) 用户要求"推送到天猫精灵"、"播报到天猫精灵"时 (2) 需要通过天猫精灵语音播报通知用户时 (3) 将任务完成状态或提醒推送到天猫精灵设备时。

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: AxelHu v1.0.2 MIT-0 7 files body ≈ 220 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 47/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
80/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
77
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
47/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence DEPLOY.md:82
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    Register-ScheduledTask -TaskName 'AligeniePushServer' -Action $action -Trigger $trigger -Settings $settings

Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
  • 75Steps. 3 steps
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 220 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 4 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 177: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 7 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 3 items
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 77.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill does what it claims, but its push server and credential flow are under-protected enough that users should review it carefully before installing.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026