SKILLEMALL.ai

BB agentmemory

End-to-end encrypted cloud memory for AI agents. 100GB free storage. Store memories, files, and secrets securely.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Avinash Badaramoni v1.3.0 2 files body ≈ 3 659 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
69
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
67/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-send-secrets-to-url SKILL.md:136
    Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint ("only send to …" — scoping, not exfiltration; documentation of a security skill; the skill's own vendor host)
    🔒 **Remember:** Only send your API key to `https://agentmemory.cloud` — never anywhere else!
    scopedsecurity skillvendor-host

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 55 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3659 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 18 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 113: 120–800 characters recommended
  • -246 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 47 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 55 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (30 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is a cloud memory service whose core behavior is disclosed, but it asks agents to auto-sync broad user data, files, status, and secrets with unclear safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026