BC baidu-drive
百度网盘(Baidu Drive)文件管理 — 上传、下载、转存、分享、搜索、移动、复制、重命名、创建文件夹。 同时支持 Agent 记忆备份/恢复（kimiclaw/maxclaw/qclaw/openclaw）。 TRIGGER: 用户提及"百度网盘/bdpan/网盘/云盘/baidu drive/Baidu Drive"并涉及文件操作； 或用户提及"备份记忆"、"恢复记忆"、"查看记忆备份"等记忆相关操作。 DO NOT TRIGGER: 非文件存储操作，或使用其他云盘服务时；本地记忆整理/清理操作；PPT 生成操作（已独立为 baidu-wenku-aippt skill）。
As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 2
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-disable-securityreference/troubleshooting.md:292Disables a security control (Defender, Gatekeeper, SIP, firewall, execution policy)xattr -d com.apple.quarantine ~/.local/bin/bdpan
Medium and low: 1
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medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Bash Read Glob Grep AskUserQuestion
Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 29 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1779 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
- low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 2 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 304: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 28 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 29 items
- +4Has examples (18 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 5)
- +3All 5 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 96.