SKILLEMALL.ai

BD 自媒体文案生成器

一键生成多平台爆款文案 - 小红书/抖音/公众号/知乎

ClawHub Agent Skills author: xiaomo v0.1.0 17 files body ≈ 419 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 39/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
78/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
55
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
39/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token src/generator.py:272
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    api_key = "sk-s…606"
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal src/generator.py:272
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    api_key = "sk-s…606"

Files scanned: 16. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-short description under 40 chars: too little signal for triggering
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "dependencies"

Process rating: all ten parameters 39/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (自媒体文案生成器) differs from the folder (social-media-copywriter-generator)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 30 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 419 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 27: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 20 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 30 items
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 55.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This looks like a real social-media copywriting skill, but it embeds a third-party LLM API key and does not clearly tell users when their prompts could be sent outside the local tool.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026