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DC article-factory-wechat

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: beneclaw v1.3.0 MIT-0 25 files body ≈ 649 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureWriting and documentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
53/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
89
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 11

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 11
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:80
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…bKX+KS9G…yMA/NhKJ…RGz/Q==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:141
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…Wwy+ghLE…vfU/YnxW…fdg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:169
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…DYr+NSUK…Itc/irNR…37y+AMujNyNtG+1Rggw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:262
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…2BV+FY5ZFezP/ypmwayk68+NzzA…NFD/uUmBJuGoXw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:304
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…vZS+VIDU…jX4+qx9M…saQ==",
    detector
  • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url scripts/submit-draft.js:100
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
    const apiUrl = `https://api.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/token?grant_type=…&appid=…&secret=…
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url scripts/submit-draft.js:129
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
    const apiUrl = `https://api.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/material/get_materialcount?access_token=…
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url scripts/submit-draft.js:169
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
    const apiUrl = `https://api.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/material/add_material?access_token=…&type=…
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url scripts/submit-draft.js:220
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
    const apiUrl = `https://api.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/material/add_material?access_token=…&type=…
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url scripts/submit-draft.js:323
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
    const apiUrl = `https://api.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/draft/add?access_token=…
    placeholder
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/temp-convert.js:49
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox']
    detectorcode literal

Files scanned: 25. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 14 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 649 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • -34 of 5 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill largely matches its WeChat article-drafting purpose, but it saves a live WeChat access token in a draft output file and uses broad external-upload workflows that users should review carefully.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026