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BC cloudways-mcp

Operational guide for managing Cloudways servers and applications, across one or several Cloudways accounts, via the official Cloudways MCP server (Cloudways' hosted MCP / Remote MCP, per their support docs). Use whenever the user mentions Cloudways, a Cloudways server or app, server monitoring, app monitoring, bandwidth, disk usage, PHP/MySQL/traffic analytics, Varnish cache, app cloning, backups/restore on Cloudways, Git deployments on Cloudways, SSL/Let's Encrypt on Cloudways, malware scans / Security Suite, staging sync, team members, AgencyOS client billing, or running an audit/onboarding on a Cloudways-hosted client site. Any write operation (start/stop/restart server, backup, restore, update CNAME, purge cache, change service state, git pull, SSL install/revoke, IP whitelist update, staging sync, team/billing changes, delete server/app) requires explicit confirmation of target server/app and intended action before execution.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Ben Kalsky v1.5.3 MIT-0 10 files body ≈ 4 760 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed just now

Operational guide for managing Cloudways servers and applications, across one or several Cloudways accounts, via the official Cloudways MCP server (Cloudways'…

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

AnalyzerMySQLAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
93
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 7

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 7
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token bridge/package-lock.json:31
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…FFX/+gVeY…NlM++NqRc…bqg==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token bridge/package-lock.json:37
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…TCe+hyPXUD/3LEl…pHA==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token bridge/package-lock.json:247
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…FrF+LTRo…W3g==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token bridge/package-lock.json:256
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…A6j+hAmM…GbS+kf5c…csw==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token bridge/package-lock.json:444
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…TW9+dDYC6wMh/t/vYA4…qWz/n3vr…iyP+zk2mXsoMA/i/7qV6…t1A==",
      detector
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use references/workflows-automation.md:32
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -sH "Authorization: Bearer $CLOUDWAYS_ACCESS_TOKEN" \
      security skill
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use references/workflows-automation.md:67
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (documentation of a security skill)
      curl -sH "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
      security skill

    Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 42, 137): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

    Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 14 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4760 tokens
    • 100Steps. 61 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 5 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Description length 945: 120–800 characters recommended
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -225 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Structure: 15 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 61 items
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (6 of 6)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This is a coherent Cloudways operations guide that clearly discloses high-impact MCP access and adds confirmation and credential-handling guardrails, though users should install it only with narrowly scoped tokens.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 13 Sept 2026