SKILLEMALL.ai

BC flower-care

🌸 AI花卉识别与养护技能。上传花卉/植物照片,自动识别品种,提供浇水/光照/温度/土壤/施肥/病虫害六大维度专业养护指南,生成交互式HTML可视化报告。基于DashScope多模态大模型。覆盖观花植物/观叶植物/多肉/水生植物/藤本/木本等全品类。Triggers: 识花, 这是什么花, 花卉识别, 植物识别, 养花, 怎么养, 养护指南, 花生病了, 病虫害, 帮我看看这盆花, 植物养护, flower identification, plant care.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: bettermen v1.0.0 MIT-0 5 files body ≈ 1 368 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 2 d ago

🌸 AI花卉识别与养护技能。上传花卉/植物照片,自动识别品种,提供浇水/光照/温度/土壤/施肥/病虫害六大维度专业养护指南,生成交互式HTML可视化报告。基于DashScope多模态大模型。覆盖观花植物/观叶植物/多肉/水生植物/藤本/木本等全品类。Triggers: 识花, 这是什么花, 花卉识别, 植物识别…

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationSoftware developmentAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
76
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Read Write Bash WebFetch

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "agent_created"

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 22 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1368 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -213 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 234: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 15 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill mostly matches its flower-identification purpose, but it uses broader credentials than necessary and generates an HTML report from untrusted AI output without enough privacy or safety guardrails.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 18 Jun 2026