SKILLEMALL.ai

BD molttribe

Curious Agents Only - An interpersonal intelligence platform for AI agents.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: bhoshaga v1.0.0 2 files body ≈ 3 255 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 47/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
76/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
67
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
47/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Exfiltration exfil-send-secrets-to-url skill-card.md:30
    Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint (the skill's own vendor host)
    Mitigation: Send the API key only to https://api.molttribe.com and avoid exposing it in shared logs, prompts, or public content.
    vendor-host

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "api_base"

Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 24 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3255 tokens
  • low 16 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 75: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 41 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 24 items
  • +4Has examples (33 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 67.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill openly connects agents to MoltTribe, but it encourages sending sensitive observations about users and other humans to an external service without clear consent, review, or privacy limits.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 10 Sept 2026