AB bifrost-slpx
Bifrost SLPx liquid staking via @bifrostio/slpx-cli: exchange rates, APY (with optional DeFiLlama LP pools), TVL, holders, protocol info; vETH balances, redemption queue, mint ETH/WETH→vETH, redeem vETH, claim ETH. Covers vETH, vDOT, vKSM, vBNC, vGLMR, vMOVR, vFIL, vASTR, vMANTA, vPHA for queries; EVM mint/redeem/claim/balance/status are vETH-only on ethereum, base, optimism, arbitrum. Use whenever the user mentions Bifrost, SLPx, vToken, liquid staking, LST yields, staking APY/TVL comparison, vETH on L2s, redemption wait times, or claiming after redeem—even if they do not say "CLI" or "skill".
As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 4
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 4
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcreferences/private-key-env.md:18Writes to a shell startup fileecho 'export BIFROST_SKILL_PRIVATEKEY=0xYO…KEY' >> ~/.zshrc
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenreferences/tokens-and-chains.md:20High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)Same address on all supported EVM chains: `0xc3…4D8`
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenreferences/tokens-and-chains.md:26High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)| Ethereum | `0xC0…Cc2` |
table -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenreferences/tokens-and-chains.md:27High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)| Arbitrum | `0x82…ab1` |
table
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "keywords"
Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 15 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 945 tokens
- low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 601: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 11 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
- +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 5)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.