CD wechat-push-skill
微信主动推送 — 让本地 Agent 主动推送消息到用户手机微信（绕过 24h 客服窗口限制）。当用户提到 微信主动推送、推微信消息、push 微信、给用户发微信、绕过 24h 限制、推送失败排查、推送假成功、ret=-2、errcode=-14、session timeout 时触发。涵盖：openclaw message send CLI 通道、4 个自动化 cron、bot 账号活跃度探测、5 跳链路自检、假成功/假活 6 种故障模式库。
微信主动推送 — 让本地 Agent 主动推送消息到用户手机微信（绕过 24h 客服窗口限制）。当用户提到 微信主动推送、推微信消息、push 微信、给用户发微信、绕过 24h 限制、推送失败排查、推送假成功、ret=-2、errcode=-14、session timeout 时触发。涵盖：openclaw…
As a process D 43/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
-
high Dangerous commands
cmd-persistencereferences/troubleshooting.md:92Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.wechat-tunnel.plist
-
high Dangerous commands
cmd-persistencereferences/troubleshooting.md:93Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.wechat-tunnel.plist
Medium and low: 1
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-shell-rcinstall.sh:153Writes to a shell startup fileecho " 加这一行到 ~/.zshrc 或 ~/.bashrc:"
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 23 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 826 tokens
- low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 224: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 15 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
- +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.