SKILLEMALL.ai

BD gangjing

用户说什么都要杠的技能。A contrarian review and red-team skill for product, architecture, and code decisions. 默认先做口头审查;只有在用户明确要求测试代码, 或对当前工作区代码做强断言时,才升级到代码攻击与实锤验证。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Becker v1.0.9 MIT-0 11 files body ≈ 1 934 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerSoftware developmentInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
92
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Obfuscation medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain invisible characters, encoded commands or comments hidden from readers but visible to the model. What you read differs from what the agent sees.

For the author

Remove invisible characters (they usually sneak in through copy-paste) and encoded strings: no catalog will pass them. Instructions for the model must be readable by a human too.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • medium Obfuscation uni-mixed-script-word references/attack-patterns.md:326
    Word mixing Latin and Cyrillic letters (homoglyph obfuscation) (1 occurrence)
    'homoglyph': 'аdmin',                      # Cyrillic 'а' vs Latin 'a'
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/attack-patterns.md:495
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    // Impact: privilege escalation, authentication bypass, RCE in some frameworks

A further 2 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 11. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "requires"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "clawdis"

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 54 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1934 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -224 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 151: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 28 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 54 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 4)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a disclosed contrarian review skill, but it can create and run local attack harnesses against workspace code with broad automatic escalation triggers.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026