SKILLEMALL.ai

BD red-team

对抗性方案审查工作流。专门扮演最挑剔的反对者,系统性地攻击任何方案、决策、 计划或论点——找漏洞、列风险、提反例、暴露盲区。 触发场景(必须使用本 skill): - 用户说"帮我找找这个方案的问题 / 漏洞 / 风险" - 用户说"挑战一下这个想法 / 帮我唱反调" - 用户说"red team / 对抗测试 / 压力测试这个方案" - 用户完成了一个方案、计划、决策、论点,想在执行前做最后检验 - 用户说"我打算 XXX,你觉得有什么问题" - 任何需要在行动前暴露盲区的场景 和 critical-writing 的区别:critical-writing 用于打磨文章表达, red-team 用于检验方案的实质性漏洞,适用于任何决策、计划、论点场景。

ClawHub Hermes author: boboy v1.0.0 MIT-0 6 files body ≈ 548 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
93
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. For Hermes the description must be one sentence under 60 characters; move the conditions to a "When to Use" section.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 7
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security examples/example-startup-plan.md:1
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)
    # 示例:创业方案 Red Team
    fixture
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security skill-card.md:2
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    Red Team Pro guides an agent through a Chinese adversarial review workflow that challenges plans, decisions, and arguments through logic, execution, and worst-case risk rounds. <br>
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:10
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - 用户说"red team / 对抗测试 / 压力测试这个方案"
    quoted
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:36
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    # Red Team — 对抗性方案审查工作流
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:87
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    ## 本次 Red Team 阵型
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:177
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    📋 Red Team 综合评估
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:199
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - Red Team 的目标是**暴露问题**,不是帮用户完善方案——保持攻击性

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-long-hermes description is 334 chars; the Hermes authoring standard requires ≤ 60 (one sentence, ending with a period)
  • warning description-no-when neither description nor a "## When to Use" section says when to use the skill
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "difficulty"

Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (red-team) differs from the folder (red-team-pro)
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 5 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 548 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 4 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 333: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 11 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 5 items
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This is a disclosed Chinese red-team review skill that may be blunt or over-eager, but it does not show hidden access, execution, data theft, or destructive behavior.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026