SKILLEMALL.ai

AC claw-mail

Multi-account email management skill for IMAP/SMTP. Fetches, reads, searches, composes, sends, replies, forwards, and organizes emails across multiple accounts. Features IMAP Outbox for reliable delivery, secure credential storage via 1Password and macOS Keychain, TLS 1.2+ with hardened ciphers, OAuth2 authentication, IMAP IDLE push monitoring, connection pooling, S/MIME signing, calendar invitations, mail merge, conversation threading, webhook rule actions, and configurable dated-folder archival.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Kamau Wanguhu v1.0.0 38 files body ≈ 2 557 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
90/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
80
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 3
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url references/REFERENCE.md:727
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    webhook_url: "https://hooks.slack.com/services/..."
    placeholder
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal scripts/lib/smime.py:74
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    pwd = self…ode() if self…ord else None

A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 38. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 17 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 12 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2557 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 502: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 22 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 12 items
  • +4Has examples (12 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
  • +3All 18 scripts are documented
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a coherent email-management skill, but it needs Review because it combines broad mailbox access with under-scoped sending, webhook, credential, and persistence controls.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026