SKILLEMALL.ai

BD bozo-aigc

文生图与图生图 AI 图片生成工具。使用 BizyAir GPT_IMAGE_2 API 进行文本转图片和多图参考生成。当用户需要生成图片、创建配图、文生图、文本转图片、AI 绘画、图生图、参考图片生成、多图融合、设置图片尺寸比例、生成横版/竖版图片时触发此技能。即使用户只说"帮我画一张"、"生成图片"、"根据这些图片生成"也应触发。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: bozoyan v2.0.0 MIT-0 5 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 612 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 43/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
90
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
43/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/image-to-image.sh:46
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "  # 永久设置:添加到 ~/.bashrc 或 ~/.zshrc"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc scripts/text-to-image.sh:51
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "  # 永久设置:添加到 ~/.bashrc 或 ~/.zshrc"

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 23 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 612 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 168: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
  • +3All 2 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill appears to be a legitimate image-generation integration, but it needs review because it exposes part of an API key in logs and uses broad local shell/permission behavior around a third-party API.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026