SKILLEMALL.ai

CC use-cursor

Manage Cursor CLI tasks via tmux with security hardening

ClawHub Agent Skills author: brucezhu888 v1.0.11 MIT-0 14 files · 6 scripts body ≈ 3 035 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
70/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
72
Quality 40%
68
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 8
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs extensions/use-cursor/index.js:49
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (string literal in code, not executed; code comment)
    *   Input:  task'; rm -rf /; echo '
    code literalcomment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs extensions/use-cursor/index.js:50
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (string literal in code, not executed; code comment)
    *   Step 1: Replace ' with '\''  →  task'\''; rm -rf /; echo '\''
    code literalcomment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs extensions/use-cursor/index.js:51
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (string literal in code, not executed; code comment)
    *   Step 2: Wrap in '...'        →  'task'\''; rm -rf /; echo '\''
    code literalcomment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs extensions/use-cursor/index.js:52
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (code comment; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    *   Shell receives: literal string "task'; rm -rf /; echo '", no injection
    commentquoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell README.md:28
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill; the skill's own vendor host)
    curl https://cursor.com/install -fsS | bash
    security skillvendor-host
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell scripts/doctor.sh:25
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (string literal in code, not executed; the skill's own vendor host)
    echo "✗ NOT FOUND - run: curl https://cursor.com/install -fsS | bash"
    code literalvendor-host
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell SKILL.md:116
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill; the skill's own vendor host)
    # curl https://cursor.com/install -fsS | bash
    security skillvendor-host

A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "source"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "repository"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "required"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "clawhub"

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 10 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
  • 100Steps. 60 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3035 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 56: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -245 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 45 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 60 items
  • +4Has examples (19 code blocks)
  • +3All 6 scripts are documented
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 68.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a legitimate Cursor/tmux helper, but it needs review because it can run trusted background agent commands through a shell and keeps authenticated tmux sessions alive.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026