SKILLEMALL.ai

DD document-organizer

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: byteuser1977 v1.0.4 MIT-0 14 files body ≈ 1 549 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
56/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 2
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/TROUBLESHOOTING.md:140
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo chmod -R u+rwX /path/to/directory
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url references/EXAMPLES.md:524
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    "webhook": "https://hooks.slack.com/..."
    placeholder

Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 47 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1549 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -212 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -47 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 32 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 47 items
  • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This is a coherent local document-to-Markdown converter, with normal caution needed for bulk processing sensitive or untrusted files.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026