AC chargebee
Chargebee API integration with managed OAuth. Install only if you need Chargebee billing administration. Connect with least-privilege access, verify the intended connection ID before each request, and revoke unused connections promptly. This integration can mutate billing data — approve only specific write actions after checking the exact endpoint, account, resource ID, and consequence. For other third party apps, use the api-gateway skill (https://clawhub.ai/byungkyu/api-gateway). Calls run through the `maton` CLI with OAuth login; default to read and list calls, and confirm every write or new connection with the user.
As a process C 64/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.
Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 1
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 1
-
medium Broad scope
meta-broad-allowed-toolsSKILL.md:1Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bashallowed-tools: Bash Read Grep Glob
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 64/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 30Running it twice. 67 mutating operations with no state check
- 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4764 tokens
- 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
- 100Steps. 58 steps
- 100Failures and branches. 6 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
- high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 627: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 54 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 58 items
- +4Has examples (39 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.