SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

CD agent-security-scanner

AI Agent 安全扫描器 - 通用恶意代码检测 + 多语言支持 + CLI 工具

ClawHub Agent Skills author: caidongyun v1.0.0 MIT-0 27 files body ≈ 1 178 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 41/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
70/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
76
Quality 40%
61
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
41/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 12

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 12
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence src/engine/smart_pattern_detector.py:34
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    "/etc/profile.d": 10, ".bashrc": 8, "Register-ScheduledTask": 12,
    code literal
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key src/llm_analyzer.py:26
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-destructive-fs src/multi_language_scanner_v4.py:474
    Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive) (string literal in code, not executed; documentation of a security skill)
    (':(){ :|:& };:', 'fork_bomb_classic', 50),
    code literalsecurity skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process RELEASE_NOTES_v5.5.1.md:74
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    命令：nohup python3 lingshun_scanner_daemon.py &
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention RELEASE_NOTES_v5.5.1.md:79
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation of a security skill)
    命令：crontab -e 配置
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process RELEASE_NOTES.md:109
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    nohup python3 lingshun_scanner_daemon.py > logs/daemon.log 2>&1 &
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process SKILL.md:168
    Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
    nohup python3 lingshun_scanner_daemon.py > logs/daemon.log 2>&1 &
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SKILL.md:186
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (documentation of a security skill)
    crontab -e
    security skill
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege src/engine/smart_pattern_detector.py:27
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    "os.setuid(": 20, "os.setgid(": 15, "os.chmod 0": 15,
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege src/engine/smart_pattern_detector.py:28
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    "chmod +s": 20, "sudoers": 10, "setuid": 10, "setgid": 10,
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process src/engine/smart_pattern_detector.py:32
    Starts a background / autostarted process (string literal in code, not executed)
    "crontab": 10, "/etc/cron": 10, "systemctl enable": 10, "systemctl start": 8,
    code literal

A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 27. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "repository"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "bugs"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "required_env_vars"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "optional_env_vars"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "persistence"

Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (agent-security-scanner) differs from the folder (agent-security-skill-scanner-gitee)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 53 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1178 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 42: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -248 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -45 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 31 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 53 items
  • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 61.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill appears to be a security scanner, but its artifacts have enough scope, persistence, and reliability problems that users should review it before installing.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026