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BF cargo-workspace-management

Administer a Cargo workspace and talk back to the Cargo team — invite and manage members, mint and rotate API tokens, organize plays, tools, and agents into folders, inspect roles, upload batch input files, and file reports. Triggers: "invite my teammate", "create an API token for CI", "who has access", "organize these into folders", "rotate that token", "upload this CSV for a batch" — and for feedback: "report this bug to Cargo", "send feedback to the Cargo team", "this CLI command is broken", "share this session with Cargo", "request a feature". Most commands need a token with admin access. Skip when: the question is about credits, plans, or invoices — use cargo-billing.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Cargo v1.2.2 MIT-0 10 files body ≈ 2 607 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Administer a Cargo workspace and talk back to the Cargo team — invite and manage members, mint and rotate API tokens, organize plays, tools, and agents into…

As a process F 45/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: ../cargo/references/prerequisites.md, ../cargo/SKILL.md, references/examples/tools.md

IntegrationGitHubData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
80
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
45/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: ../cargo/references/prerequisites.md, ../cargo/SKILL.md, references/examples/tools.md
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell references/examples/sessions.md:57
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (test fixture / example file)
    curl -fsSL https://api.getcargo.io/install.sh | sh
    fixture

Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: ../cargo/references/prerequisites.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: ../cargo/SKILL.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: references/examples/tools.md
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 45/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: ../cargo/references/prerequisites.md, ../cargo/SKILL.md, references/examples/tools.md
  • 0Tools and files. 3 referenced file(s) missing: ../cargo/references/prerequisites.md, ../cargo/SKILL.md, references/examples/tools.md
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 8 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 11 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2607 tokens
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 11 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 681: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 11 items
  • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill mostly matches its Cargo workspace-admin purpose, but it includes high-impact admin actions plus optional Claude session hooks that persist locally and summarize session transcripts without enough privacy scoping.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · 27 Aug 2026