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Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: CatsMeow492 v0.1.0 32 files body ≈ 472 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
57/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 5

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 5
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:18
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha512-GZMB+a0mO…4cw+w1WV…UED+1X8a…sJi+8mgpw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:188
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…HK5+NE/tvnRLbIqUWa+0E9N4WNMjmp/kXXP…R8w==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:409
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…78O/B3Kkh+nKABUF++bvJv…56W+C8F9…X6m+IktJnIb1Jjg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:551
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…zN3+kuBL…KQ8+XS6hp9nY7B+ZeK0…Haw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:565
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…j98+PZe/AXaG…EeK+Mrp9…mrw==",
    detector

Files scanned: 21. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 15 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 472 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 6 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 15 items
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This plugin is presented as encrypted, trust-tiered agent messaging, but the inspected code sends only Base64-encoded message content and routes inbound remote messages as command-authorized without applying the advertised trust checks.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 10 Sept 2026