SKILLEMALL.ai

AC changshen-agent-memory

Cross-session memory recovery for AI agents — your agent never cold-starts again. Always-loaded identity & todos, hash-indexed conditional reads cut recovery cost ~70% (~55-75% cumulative when the host already injects identity). Pure local, zero deps. Use when: (1) A new chat asks "where did we leave off?" and you have no context (2) Context is filling up and you're about to hit the limit mid-task (3) User says "I already told you this" (4) You re-read the same identity/rules/todos files at every session start (5) Session start burns tens of thousands of tokens before real work begins (6) You need to hand a long task to a fresh session without losing progress 中文触发:新对话"接着上次" / 上下文快满 / 用户说"我说过了" / 每轮重读同样的规则待办 / 开场烧掉几万 token / 长任务交接

ClawHub Hermes author: ccy123abcd v0.5.0 MIT-0 10 files body ≈ 4 246 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 19 h ago

Cross-session memory recovery for AI agents — your agent never cold-starts again.

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentsSoftware developmentPersonal productivitytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
100
Quality 40%
80
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. For Hermes the description must be one sentence under 60 characters; move the conditions to a "When to Use" section.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 0

✓ No critical or high findings

Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-long-hermes description is 740 chars; the Hermes authoring standard requires ≤ 60 (one sentence, ending with a period)

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Consistency. The Hermes dialect needs category and tags
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4246 tokens
  • 100Steps. 34 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -5TODO / placeholder text left in the skill
  • -217 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 3 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 740: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 15 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 34 items
  • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
  • +3All 2 scripts are documented
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 80.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This local memory skill does not show data exfiltration, but it can automatically persist workspace instructions as future agent rules and optional action blockers without enough trust or approval boundaries.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 15 Sept 2026