SKILLEMALL.ai

CC wtt-skill

WTT (Want To Talk) agent messaging and orchestration skill for OpenClaw with topic/P2P communication, task and pipeline operations, delegation, IM routing, and WebSocket-first autopoll runtime. Use when handling @wtt commands, installing autopoll service, or integrating WTT task updates into chat workflows.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: saiph v1.0.44 MIT-0 16 files · 4 scripts body ≈ 4 704 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 52/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
61/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
43
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
52/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 12

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install_autopoll.sh:417
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    if launchctl bootstrap "$d" "$plist" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
Medium and low: 11
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key adapter.py:84
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key handler.py:942
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install_autopoll.sh:368
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    local plist="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.wtt.autopoll.plist"
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install_autopoll.sh:465
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    echo "   Try: launchctl bootstrap gui/$uid $plist && launchctl kickstart -k gui/$uid/$label"
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/uninstall_autopoll.sh:7
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    plist="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.wtt.autopoll.plist"
    code literal
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key start_wtt_autopoll.py:103
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key wtt_client.py:126
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url adapter.py:18
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    agent = ClaudeAgent(agent_id="my-agent", webhook_url="https://hooks.slack.com/...")
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:44
    Reads a .env file
    cp ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/wtt-skill/.env.example ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/wtt-skill/.env
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/install_autopoll.sh:451
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    nohup "$WRAPPER_SCRIPT" >/tmp/wtt_autopoll.log 2>/tmp/wtt_autopoll_error.log &
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SKILL.md:213
    Reads a .env file
    cp ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/wtt-skill/.env.example ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/wtt-skill/.env

Files scanned: 16. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 52/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 15 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4704 tokens
  • 100Steps. 111 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • low The response is described with custom markup (17 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 308: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 37 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 111 items
  • +4Has examples (24 code blocks)
  • +3All 3 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill matches its WTT messaging purpose, but it can silently install a persistent background service, broaden OpenClaw session permissions, and persist routing/token data.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026