FD app-rank-monitor
(no description)
As a process D 41/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.
The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 11
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-persistencedocs/定时任务配置说明.md:66Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.cfans.diandian-daily-fetch.plist
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-persistencedocs/定时任务配置说明.md:69Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)launchctl unload ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.cfans.diandian-daily-fetch.plist
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-persistencedocs/定时任务配置说明.md:75Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)launchctl start ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.cfans.diandian-daily-fetch.plist
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-persistencedocs/定时任务配置说明.md:182Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)ls -l ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.cfans.diandian-daily-fetch.plist
Medium and low: 7
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medium Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenconfig/dingtalk.yaml:7Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)client_secret: "ECW-…z66"
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-persistencedocs/定时任务配置说明.md:22Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)- **配置文件**: `~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.cfans.diandian-daily-fetch.plist`
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalconfig/dingtalk.yaml:7Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)client_secret: "ECW-…z66"
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low Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenconfig/dingtalk.yaml:11Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)webhook: "https://oapi.dingtalk.com/robot/send?access_token=…"
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalconfig/dingtalk.yaml:11Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)webhook: "https://oapi.dingtalk.com/robot/send?access_token=…"
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenconfig/ios_rank.yaml:4Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)dingtalk_webhook: "https://oapi.dingtalk.com/robot/send?access_token=…"
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalconfig/ios_rank.yaml:4Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)dingtalk_webhook: "https://oapi.dingtalk.com/robot/send?access_token=…"
quoted
Files scanned: 74. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
frontmatterSKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found - error
name-missingSKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name` - error
description-missingSKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 31 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 715 tokens
- low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- -235 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 23 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 31 items
- +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 2)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.