SKILLEMALL.ai

BD paimon-skill

派蒙 - 原神特化 AI 游戏伴侣。让你的 OpenClaw 直接化身派蒙,实时看到你的游戏截图,给你实时指引,甚至能点击游戏按钮帮你操作。再也不用手动截图到百度贴吧问了——打开圣遗物等培养界面,让派蒙看到你的数值,给你培养建议。此模块为 play-any-game 子模块,依赖父模块核心能力。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: lifesize v1.1.1 MIT-0 27 files body ≈ 1 768 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
69
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump games/default/SOUL.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    games/default/SOUL.md

Files scanned: 22. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 52 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1768 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -225 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -42 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 148: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 38 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 52 items
  • +4Has examples (15 code blocks)
  • +3All 7 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a real game-helper skill, but it needs Review because it can capture screens, send images to a cloud AI service, control mouse and keyboard input, and store secrets with weak safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026