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DD lobster-agent-wallet

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: chengtang05-hash v0.1.0 MIT-0 9 files body ≈ 566 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 36/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: steps, result and completion, when it triggers

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
53/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
89
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
36/100
Unfinished process
Steps w 15
0
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 7
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets lib/x402-client.mjs:56
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    * @param {string} privateKey - Wallet private key (from env)
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token lib/core.mjs:21
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    usdc: '0x83…913',
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token lib/core.mjs:28
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    usdc: '0x03…F7e',
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:24
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "integrity": "sha5…p81+8Ob3…L40/b0i7…gQw==",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:86
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "integrity": "sha512-+lF0B…kdX+94aG…d8c+B3KT…U6A==",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token x402-client.mjs:16
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    usdcAddress: '0x83…913',
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token x402-client.mjs:21
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    usdcAddress: '0x03…F7e',
    quoted

Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 36/100

  • 0Steps. Prose only: no discrete steps
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 566 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3No numbered steps or checklist
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 9 headings
  • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This wallet skill does what it claims, but it can authorize real USDC payments from server-provided terms without enough user-visible limits or checks.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 28 May 2026