CB claude-code-delegate
Delegate programming tasks to Claude Code CLI
Delegate programming tasks to Claude Code CLI
As a process B 76/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
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high Dangerous commands
cmd-persistenceREADME.md:106Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.* # System services
Medium and low: 2
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-persistenceREADME.md:116Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)'/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw',
quoted -
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-persistenceSKILL.md:169Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (detector / deny-list definition)2. **Set up the write-guard plugin** — This is the most important safety measure. See README.md for the full plugin code. The write-guard blocks writes to platform config files (`.openclaw/`, `LaunchA
detector
Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 76/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 100Steps. 34 steps
- 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
- 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1793 tokens
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 45: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 21 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 34 items
- +4Has examples (4 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.