SKILLEMALL.ai
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DC finance-automation

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Chloe Park v0.2.1 25 files body ≈ 349 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, failures and branches

ProcedureStripeInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
52/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
86
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 10

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 10
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key src/config/config.js:25
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv QUICKSTART.md:21
    Reads a .env file
    cp .env.example .env
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url QUICKSTART.md:68
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    # https://xxxx.ngrok.io 주소를 Stripe Dashboard에 등록
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url QUICKSTART.md:173
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    curl "https://api.telegram.org/bot<YOUR_BOT_TOKEN>/getMe"
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url QUICKSTART.md:176
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    curl "https://api.telegram.org/bot<YOUR_BOT_TOKEN>/getUpdates"
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:120
    Reads a .env file
    cp .env.example .env
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url README.md:191
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    # https://xxxx.ngrok.io/webhook/stripe를 Stripe Dashboard에 등록
    placeholder
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv scripts/init-db.js:67
    Reads a .env file (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    console.log('1. Copy .env.example to .env');
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv SKILL.md:15
    Reads a .env file
    cp .env.example .env
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url src/services/notification.js:128
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    `https://api.telegram.org/bot${config.telegram.botToken}/sendMessage`,
    placeholder

Files scanned: 25. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 8 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 349 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 6 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 8 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill matches its finance automation purpose, but it exposes sensitive finance-changing API routes without implemented authentication, so users should review and harden it before installation.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026