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DD biliyoutik2brain

视频→结构化知识引擎 v4.0。触发：B站/YouTube/抖音/小红书链接→转录+结构化分析+知识归档。不触发：纯文本内容/非视频链接/无URL的对话。单条命令完成采集→转录→LLM修复→分析→保存。支持一键部署、4+N平台插件、反爬中间件、OCR关键帧、多格式输出(笔记/卡片/富文本/错题)、反馈闭环、图文并茂MD。

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: CHOI8467 v4.0.5 MIT-0 80 files · 71 scripts body ≈ 515 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 6 d ago

视频→结构化知识引擎…

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureYouTubeAI and agentsMedia and videotype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
61/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
57
Quality 40%
68
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/biliyoutik2brain/core/anti_crawl_middleware.py:117
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    def extract_cookies(browser: str = "edge", platform: str = "") -> List[Dict]:
Medium and low: 5
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/biliyoutik2brain/core/anti_crawl_middleware.py:98
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "darwin": os.path.expanduser("~/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome/Default/Cookies"),
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/biliyoutik2brain/core/anti_crawl_middleware.py:99
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "linux": os.path.expanduser("~/.config/google-chrome/Default/Cookies"),
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/biliyoutik2brain/core/anti_crawl_middleware.py:103
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "darwin": os.path.expanduser("~/Library/Application Support/Microsoft Edge/Default/Cookies"),
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/biliyoutik2brain/core/anti_crawl_middleware.py:104
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "linux": os.path.expanduser("~/.config/microsoft-edge/Default/Cookies"),
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key scripts/biliyoutik2brain/core/llm.py:116
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment

Files scanned: 80. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 23 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 515 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 161: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 12 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 68.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is mostly coherent for video transcription and knowledge archiving, but it automatically uses browser session cookies and has an advertised privacy mode that is not actually enforced by the main CLI/LLM path.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 9 Jul 2026