SKILLEMALL.ai

BC ipeaky

Secure API key management for OpenClaw. Store, list, test, and delete API keys without exposing them in chat history. Keys are stored directly in openclaw.json via gateway config.patch — fully native integration. Use when a user needs to provide, manage, or test API keys (e.g., OpenAI, ElevenLabs, Anthropic, Brave, or any service). Triggers on phrases like "add API key", "store my key", "manage keys", "test my key", "set up API key", or when a skill requires an API key that isn't configured.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: christiancattaneo v3.2.0 17 files · 11 scripts body ≈ 1 547 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 57/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

IntegrationStripeAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
89/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
81
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
57/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 5

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 5
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/store_key_v4.sh:97
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      osascript -e "display dialog \"Found ${KEY_COUNT} keys:\n${KEY_NAMES}\n\nStore all to ${CONFIG_PREFIX}?\" with title \"ipeaky v4 🔑 Confirm\" buttons {\"Cancel\", \"Store All\"} default button \"Store
      quoted

    A further 4 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 16. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 57/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Steps. 32 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1547 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval
    • low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -5TODO / placeholder text left in the skill
    • -35 of 8 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 5 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 496: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 13 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 32 items
    • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This looks like a real API-key manager, but it needs Review because it overstates secret-safety guarantees and bundles high-impact Stripe billing scripts beyond the core purpose.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026