SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

BC ai-orchestrator

DeepSeek AI access via Puppeteer browser automation with CDP interceptor. Persistent daemon (~35ms startup), health checks, graceful shutdown, PM2 management. Configurable via `.deepseek.json`. Use when: (1) need DeepSeek responses without API key, (2) code analysis, review, or generation, (3) text analysis, summarization, translation, (4) "consult DeepSeek" or ask-deepseek.sh.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: ciklopentan v2.0.11 MIT-0 16 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 2 696 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 64/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationPlaywrightSoftware developmentInfrastructureWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
79
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
64/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Obfuscation medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain invisible characters, encoded commands or comments hidden from readers but visible to the model. What you read differs from what the agent sees.

For the author

Remove invisible characters (they usually sneak in through copy-paste) and encoded strings: no catalog will pass them. Instructions for the model must be readable by a human too.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 8

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 8
    • medium Obfuscation uni-mixed-script-word REFERENCE.md:235
      Word mixing Latin and Cyrillic letters (homoglyph obfuscation) (1 occurrence)
      **Механизм:** Бэкoфф удваивается (5s → 10s → 20s → 40s). Сбрасывается при успехе.
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege ask-puppeteer.js:930
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
      '--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox',
      detectorcode literal
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege deepseek-daemon.js:34
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
      '--disable-setuid-sandbox',
      code literal
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:81
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…bKX+KS9G…yMA/NhKJ…RGz/Q==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:143
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…FFX/+gVeY…NlM++NqRc…bqg==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:161
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…Wwy+ghLE…vfU/YnxW…fdg==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:189
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…DYr+NSUK…Itc/irNR…37y+AMujNyNtG+1Rggw==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:262
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…2BV+FY5ZFezP/ypmwayk68+NzzA…NFD/uUmBJuGoXw==",
      detector

    Files scanned: 16. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 64/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Steps. 39 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 6 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2696 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 17 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -222 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
    • -32 of 3 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 380: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 22 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 39 items
    • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 79.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill appears to do what it claims, but it uses a persistent logged-in browser daemon with broad local recovery actions and sensitive local artifacts that deserve review before installation.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026