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FC doubao-video-creator

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Blockedguard blocked the skill: signs of malicious behaviour
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Cindypapa v3.0.0 MIT-0 38 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 1 087 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureMedia and videoInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
0/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
0
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
Guard blocked this skill: critical findings below. Do not install it until the author fixes them.

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Secrets in code
If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
  2. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 17

  • critical Secrets in code secret-github-token FINAL_PUBLISH_GUIDE.md:33
    GitHub token
    Password: ghp_…Q1t
  • critical Secrets in code secret-github-token quick_push_github.sh:30
    GitHub token (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    echo "   密码/令牌：ghp_…Q1t"
    quoted
  • critical Secrets in code secret-github-token quick_push_github.sh:36
    GitHub token (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    export GIT_PASSWORD="ghp_…Q1t"
    quoted
  • critical Secrets in code secret-github-token quick_push_github.sh:48
    GitHub token (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    echo "   Password: ghp_…Q1t"
    quoted
Medium and low: 13
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token element_generator.py:20
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    API_KEY = "sk-d…e5a"
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege GITHUB_PUBLISH_GUIDE.md:208
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    curl -fsSL https://cli.github.com/packages/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg | sudo dd of=/usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege GITHUB_PUBLISH_GUIDE.md:209
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    echo "deb [arch=$(dpkg --print-architecture) signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg] https://cli.github.com/packages stable main" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/github-cli.lis
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token UPDATE_v1.1.md:179
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    - API Key: `sk-d…e5a`
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token UPDATE_v1.1.md:184
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    - API Key: `65ae…4e0`
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token CLAWHUB_PUBLISH_LOG.md:10
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    clawhub auth login --token clh_…Abc
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal element_generator.py:20
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    API_KEY = "sk-d…e5a"
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token FINAL_PUBLISH_GUIDE.md:33
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    Password: ghp_…Q1t
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal FINAL_PUBLISH_GUIDE.md:33
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    Password: ghp_…Q1t
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token quick_push_github.sh:30
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    echo "   密码/令牌：ghp_…Q1t"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token quick_push_github.sh:36
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    export GIT_PASSWORD="ghp_…Q1t"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token quick_push_github.sh:48
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    echo "   Password: ghp_…Q1t"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal quick_push_github.sh:48
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    echo "   Password: ghp_…Q1t"
    quoted

Files scanned: 38. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 41 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1087 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -237 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 35 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 41 items
  • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill’s video-generation purpose is understandable, but the package exposes real-looking credentials and stores user API keys and project data in plaintext without enough safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026