SKILLEMALL.ai

AB remote-terminal

Remote Linux terminal control skill. Use when the user wants to (1) connect to a remote Linux server and execute commands, (2) perform SSH operations on remote hosts, (3) manage multiple remote servers, (4) run shell commands on remote machines. Triggers on phrases like "connect to server", "SSH to", "run on remote", "execute on production", "login to my server", "在服务器上执行", "远程连接", "SSH到".

ClawHub Agent Skills author: ckaorceu v1.0.0 MIT-0 7 files body ≈ 1 695 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 73/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
98/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
99
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
73/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Tools and files w 18
60
Result and completion w 14
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process references/security_best_practices.md:87
      Starts a background / autostarted process (documentation of a security skill)
      sudo systemctl enable fail2ban
      security skill
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege SKILL.md:95
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (negated — the text forbids it)
      - `chmod 777`, `chown -R`
      negated

    A further 1 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

    Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 73/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Steps. 33 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1695 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 6 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 392: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 42 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 33 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (24 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)
    • +3All 3 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 99.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This is a legitimate remote-server administration skill, but it has risky credential handling and broad command authority that users should review carefully before installing.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026