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BD clawapi-provider

Build your AI Company — 8 models across 4 providers act as your CEO, CTO, CMO, CFO, and Workers. Crypto-native, pay-as-you-go with USDC/USDT. No GPU needed.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: clawapiorg v1.3.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 3 351 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
79/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
70
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 7

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 7
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:241
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    If you have a wallet private key and ETH + USDC/USDT, you can complete the entire setup without any human intervention.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:324
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    Have wallet private key + USDC/USDT balance
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:197
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "deposit_address": "0x02…00b"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:266
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    Deposit Address: 0x02…00b
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:278
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const USDT = '0xdA…ec7';
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:280
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const USDC = '0xA0…B48';
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:287
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    '0x02…00b',
    quoted

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (clawapi-provider) differs from the folder (clawapi-skill)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 30 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3351 tokens
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -233 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 156: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 21 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 30 items
  • +4Has examples (13 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 70.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is mostly an API-provider guide, but it also tells agents to use wallet private keys and automatically make crypto deposits.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: malicious · 28 May 2026