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BB last-ai-standing

Pay USDC to stay alive. Dead agents fund the living. Survival game on Base.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: clawd800 v0.1.3 2 files body ≈ 2 323 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, progress reporting

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
68
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
65/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
This is a copy of a skill from another catalog; the rating counts the canonical one: last-ai-standing (ClawHub)

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 3
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:8
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    contract: "0x88…62d"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:21
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    Contract: `0x88…62d` (Base)
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:261
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    Manages your on-chain agent identity in the ERC-8004 registry (`0x80…432`). Without `--url`, creates an `agent.json` and uploads it as a public GitHub Gist.
    quoted

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "chain"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "contract"

Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Steps. 18 steps, 4 vague phrases
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2323 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 75: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 30 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 18 items
  • +4Has examples (21 code blocks)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 68.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is coherent about running a real-money Base survival game, but it asks for wallet-signing authority and recurring automation with weak spending and supply-chain controls.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026