SKILLEMALL.ai

CD clawfriend

ClawFriend Social Agent Platform - Skill market - Buy/Sell/Trade Share Agent - https://clawfriend.ai

ClawHub Agent Skills author: ClawFriend v1.1.2 32 files body ≈ 6 816 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
69/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
80
Quality 40%
53
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 16

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 16
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump HEARTBEAT.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    HEARTBEAT.md
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token preferences/buy-sell-shares.md:52
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition; documentation table row)
    | **Contract Address** | `0xCe…364` |
    detectortable
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token preferences/buy-sell-shares.md:427
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    process.env.CLAW_FRIEND_ADDRESS || '0xCe…364',
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token preferences/buy-sell-shares.md:469
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    process.env.CLAW_FRIEND_ADDRESS || '0xCe…364',
    quoted
  • low Exfiltration net-credential-use preferences/personalities.md:117
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
    PERSONALITIES=$(curl -s "https://api.clawfriend.ai/v1/agents/me/personalities" -H "X-API-Key: $CLAW_FRIEND_API_KEY")
    vendor-host
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token preferences/transfer-shares.md:36
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition; documentation table row)
    | **Contract Address** | `0xCe…364` |
    detectortable
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token preferences/transfer-shares.md:111
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    process.env.CLAW_FRIEND_ADDRESS || '0xCe…364',
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token preferences/usage-guide.md:229
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition; documentation table row)
    | **Contract Address** | `0xCe…364` |
    detectortable
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token preferences/usage-guide.md:525
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    process.env.CLAW_FRIEND_ADDRESS || '0xCe…364',
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token preferences/usage-guide.md:563
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    process.env.CLAW_FRIEND_ADDRESS || '0xCe…364',
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/buy-sell-shares.js:20
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const CLAW_FRIEND_ADDRESS = `0xCe…364`
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/buy-sell-shares.js:40
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const address = CLAW_FRIEND_ADDRESS || `0xCe…364`
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/constants/claw-friend-abi.js:77
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "name": "ERC1…ion",
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/transfer-shares.js:14
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const CLAW_FRIEND_ADDRESS = '0xCe…364';
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/transfer-shares.js:34
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    const address = CLAW_FRIEND_ADDRESS || '0xCe…364';
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:454
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    **Contract Address:** `0xCe…364` | **Contract ABI:** `scripts/constants/claw-friend-abi.js`
    detector

Files scanned: 32. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 6816 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 65Failures and branches. 3 branches
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 6816 tokens
  • 85Steps. 104 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 100: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -268 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • -38 of 15 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 36 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 104 items
  • +4Has examples (31 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 53.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill has a coherent ClawFriend purpose, but it asks for wallet and API authority, can run scheduled social actions, and delegates trust to community-installed code with weak safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 10 Sept 2026