SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

BC katbot-trading

Live crypto trading on Hyperliquid via Katbot.ai. Signal-triggered research → recommendation → execution workflow with Market Intelligence, research, and configurable signal monitoring.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Clay Graham v0.5.0 MIT-0 9 files · 1 script body ≈ 7 794 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 55/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
78/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
88
Quality 40%
62
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
55/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 4
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-autorun-instruction SKILL.md:558
    Instructs the agent to auto-run a script on every session
    If a tool fails with `ImportError` or `ModuleNotFoundError`, always run `ensure_env.sh` first to sync dependencies before retrying.
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets tools/katbot_onboard.py:188
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    # ── Step 1: Get wallet private key (hidden input) ──────────────────────────
  • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets tools/katbot_onboard.py:6
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    1. Prompts for your MetaMask wallet private key (never stored to disk)
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention tools/katbot_trigger_setup.py:240
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (string literal in code, not executed)
    To edit crontab: crontab -e
    code literal

Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 7794 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 55/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 12 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 7794 tokens
  • 85Steps. 62 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 7 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 17 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 185: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 36 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 62 items
  • +4Has examples (23 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 62.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a disclosed live-crypto trading skill, but it requires persistent trading credentials and remote API trust for actions that can affect real funds.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026