AD tars-vault
Trustless encrypted vault with TOTP auth and clean-room session isolation. Secrets your agent holds but cannot read. Use when user wants to store, retrieve, or manage encrypted secrets securely.
As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
How to improve
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 0
✓ No critical or high findings
Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (tars-vault) differs from the folder (agent-scif)
- 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100Steps. 23 steps
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 835 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 194: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 11 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
- +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
- +3All 2 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.
External checks
ClawHub: suspicious
This is a coherent encrypted-vault proof of concept, but it handles real secrets through a long-lived sub-agent, local secret/session files, and automatic Telegram delivery with weak containment.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026