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BB openclaw-x402-skill

Discover, browse, filter, and pay for x402-compatible API endpoints and MCP tools from the x402 Bazaar — the autonomous discovery layer for agentic payments. Browse all available services, filter by price or type, inspect payment requirements, and call any discovered endpoint using USDC micropayments on Base with no API keys or account setup. Use when the agent needs to find a payable API service, check what x402 services exist for a given task (web scraping, AI inference, weather data, market data), pay for a single API call via x402, or list services under a given price threshold. Requires EVM_PRIVATE_KEY in .env (Base wallet with USDC) for paid calls. Discovery browsing requires no keys at all.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: CoinVest AI Innovations v0.1.0 4 files body ≈ 1 687 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 75/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, progress reporting

IntegrationAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
83/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
80
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
75/100
Nearly there
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
Failures and branches w 10
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 8

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 8
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets README.md:250
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      1. **Get a Base wallet private key:**
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets README.md:468
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      EVM_PRIVATE_KEY="0x..." # Your Base wallet private key
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:40
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      1. Get a Base wallet private key (MetaMask → export, or Coinbase Wallet)
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:101
      Reads a .env file
      cp .env.example .env
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:148
      Reads a .env file
      cp ~/.openclaw/skills/x402-bazaar/.env.example ~/.openclaw/skills/x402-bazaar/.env
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token README.md:235
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
      Recipient:    0x74…Eb1
    • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets x402-MCP.md:86
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "EVM_PRIVATE_KEY": "<private key of wallet with USDC on Base Sepolia>",
      quoted
    • low Exfiltration read-dotenv x402-MCP.md:449
      Reads a .env file
      cp ~/.openclaw/skills/x402-bazaar/.env.example ~/.openclaw/skills/x402-bazaar/.env

    Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 75/100

    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 36 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1687 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
    • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 706: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 22 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 36 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is meant to make crypto micropayments to third-party APIs, but its automatic payment flows and wallet-key handling need careful review before use.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026